Coal Sales Prices used for Valuation and Payment of Federal Royalties

A Peer Review of Previous Studies by Headwaters Economics

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I. Summary

Headwaters Economics has published two reports alleging that the coal prices reported to ONRR by producers on federal coal leases are substantially less than the actual commodity price for the coal when sold to the end user, leading to a large loss of federal royalty revenue. Headwaters reached this conclusion from its calculation of the average net mine price by coal-producing state from reported delivered coal prices. This study is a review of the data sources, analysis and conclusions reported by Headwaters. The conclusions of our review are:

1. **Headwaters selected results which supported its conclusion while ignoring contrary results.** Headwaters selected only two states (Wyoming and Montana) to support its conclusion, ignoring contrary results from its own analysis for other large federal coal states. While Headwaters claimed that the results for these other states (Colorado, New Mexico and Utah) were not as robust, based upon whether a large majority of coal sales were delivered to the electric power sector, this contention is false. Headwaters inability to replicate the reported mine prices by state from the “net delivered prices” is not evidence of under-payment of royalties on federal coal – it is evidence that Headwaters used poor-quality data and performed inadequate analysis. The fact that Headwaters selected the only two states which seemed to support its conclusion is evidence of Headwaters’ bias, seeking data to support a conclusion which it had already reached.

2. **Headwaters relied upon poor-quality estimated data to perform its analysis.** Headwaters did not have actual data for the mine prices which it estimated from the reported delivered coal prices to electric power companies; it relied upon a private third-party data service (SNL Energy) for these estimates. There are widespread errors in the price estimates from the SNL data service. SNL over-estimated the delivered coal price to the largest customer for Montana coal (which was an unregulated power company so even its delivered coal price was not reported, just estimated), leading to a huge error in its calculation of Montana coal prices. Further, SNL failed to deduct all of the costs included in the reported delivered costs to estimate the net mine prices (it only deducted estimated transportation carrier charges, but failed to deduct destination state sales taxes and rail car costs).
3. **Headwaters did not account for the fact that mines with federal coal leases have non-federal coal leases also.** Headwaters assumed that all coal produced at any mine with a federal coal lease was federal coal. This incorrect assumption resulted in Headwaters over-estimating the average mine price for federal coal in the states of Wyoming and Montana. These states have some large mines which have a “checkerboard” mix of federal and private coal leases. The coal produced from these mines is high-priced coal sold to local (“mine-mouth”) power plants. Headwaters’ assumption that all of this coal was federal coal incorrectly increased its calculated average mine price in these states.

4. **Our detailed analysis of the Montana coal sales data for FY 2014 explained the differences between Headwaters calculated “net delivered” mine prices and the prices reported to ONRR to be due to errors in the data relied upon by Headwaters and Headwaters’ flawed assumptions.** The difference between Headwaters’ calculation of the “net delivered” mine price and the coal prices reported to ONRR was greatest for the state of Montana (Headwaters calculated a mine price 44% higher than the reported price). We analyzed all of the coal sales data for Montana coal from SNL Energy relied upon by Headwaters and found large errors in Headwaters’ calculation due to the following problems:
   a. SNL had a huge error in over-estimating the delivered coal price to the Colstrip power plant, which is the largest market for Montana coal;
   b. SNL’s data did not include sales to the second-largest customer for Montana coal (Detroit Edison’s Belle River and St. Clair power plants), which were at lower prices than the average for Montana coal; and,
   c. Headwaters assumed that all coal production from mines with any federal coal lease were federal coal, but much of the coal produced at the mines with the highest sales prices (Bull Mountains and Rosebud mines) were from private coal leases, so Headwaters over-weighted the higher-priced coal in its average.

5. **Resellers of coal are a very small part of the market and are not a “loophole” avoiding federal royalties.** Headwaters provided no support for its allegation that unnamed “brokers” are reselling coal purchased from producers of federal coal at high profit margins creating an enormous “loophole” to avoid paying federal royalties. Headwaters reached the startling conclusion that the avoided federal royalties are costing the government $139 million annually, which implies that “brokers” are earning profits exceeding $1 billion annually ($139 million divided by the maximum federal royalty rate.
of 12.5% equals $1.11 billion). Actually, the federal data on coal purchases by electric power companies shows coal sales by unaffiliated resellers (Headwaters’ unnamed “brokers”) were a very small part of the market, only 1.7% of Wyoming coal sales, some of which were power companies reselling excess coal which they had purchased, and just 0.8% of Montana coal sales. The participation of coal trading companies in the market for coal from Wyoming and Montana has dwindled to almost no volume, because they have had difficulty earning any margins at all. Headwaters only evidence that there are large profit margins earned by brokers is its own flawed analysis of “net delivered” mine prices.

6. The changes to the royalty system proposed by Headwaters are not “transparent”. Headwaters repeatedly asserts that the current system of valuing coal sales for federal royalties is not transparent and its proposed change to using the “net delivered” mine prices would be transparent. In fact, the current system is transparent to ONRR, who has access to every sales contract and transaction by the federal coal lessees and audits these sales. The changes proposed by Headwaters are not transparent; they rely on inaccurate estimates provided by private data companies. Neither the lessees (the coal producers) nor ONRR have access to the data on the delivered coal prices or the “net delivered” mine prices and they cannot check or audit these numbers. Further, the data sources do not include all sales of federal coal, just sales to electric power companies. Headwaters itself was not even “transparent” in its own analysis, as it has not provided its data and calculations for others to review, yet it contends that every coal sales transaction should be available for public scrutiny to check whether ONRR is doing its job auditing coal sales prices.

II. Introduction

Energy Ventures Analysis, Inc. (“EVA”) was retained by Cloud Peak Energy (“CPE”) to perform a peer review of recent studies regarding the methods used by the Department of Interior (“DOI”), Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”) to value the sales price used to calculate royalties of federal coal leases. A series of press articles alleging that coal companies were under-paying royalties on federal coal leases\(^1\) as well as a letter to DOI from Senator Ron Wyden requesting

action by DOI\(^2\) contributed to a proposed rule by ONRR\(^3\) to make some changes to the method of valuation of coal sold from federal leases.

Some of this publicity was specifically directed at non arm’s-length sales, where coal is sold and valued using market based mechanisms, under formal transactions to affiliated entities. These affiliates were either sales companies owned by the same parent company as the lessees or vertically-integrated power companies which owned the coal supply to their power plants. This type of sale arrangement, which applies to a comparatively small percentage of Federal coal volume and is specifically covered in the existing regulations, is the subject to formal a DOI/ONRR review which was initiated in January 2015.

Subsequent to the announced review of regulations covering non arm’s-length sales, there have been further reports claiming that even coal which has been valued using the sales price under arm’s-length contracts do not properly reflect the market value of the coal.\(^4\) These reports allege that there has been massive avoidance of payment of federal coal royalties by failing to report true value of the coal sales to end users and have called for alternatives to change the point of valuation of the coal sales from the mine price (typically known as the FOB, or “free on board”, mine price) to the delivered price to the ultimate customer or using the delivered price less transportation costs to determine the FOB mine price (the net mine price), rather than the sales price reported by the lessees (the coal producers).

While theoretically, the “net delivered” mine price should yield the same result as the FOB mine price reported by the lessees, reports by a company called Headwaters Economics (“Headwaters”) allege that they have demonstrated that the calculated net mine price (which it calls the “net


delivered price”) is higher than the FOB mine prices reported to ONRR under the first arm’s-length sales price. Headwaters claims that:

“This method of valuation [i.e., the “net delivered price’] closes the loophole that may allow for companies to structure sales using affiliated brokers to artificially reduce the commodity value of federal coal that is required for royalty valuation. Most importantly, using net delivered costs would close the loophole for all sales, not only for sales where coal is marketed directly by mines and their affiliates.”

Headwaters further states that:

“Using net delivered price has significant transparency advantages, and similar benefits to streamline the assessment process for industry and ONRR compliance audits. Delivered prices are known for sales to regulated utilities (independent of the sale structure). Additional price data is revealed by sales on spot markets, and by market index prices for coal of varying qualities delivered to domestic and export markets. Market analysis firms including Platts and SNL Energy track market prices and transportation costs closely and could be used to reveal prices that would be used by mines for royalty valuation. This transparency would also allow for public review of federal royalty valuation without necessarily revealing contract prices, mining and marketing costs, and other proprietary data.”

Headwaters has prepared two analyses of the “net delivered” mine prices for coal sales from federal leases by state and compared these prices to the average prices reported to ONRR by coal producers on the sales of coal by state from its lessees pursuant to the legal disclosure obligations of the lessees.

In its January Report, Headwaters used data reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) on the delivered coal prices reported to electric power companies as well as industrial users and exports. Headwaters used a separate report from EIA on the average transportation cost of coal by state of origin to domestic power companies. Headwaters calculated the average delivered price of all coal sales by state and subtracted the average transportation costs by state of origin to determine the “net delivered” mine price. Headwaters concluded that the average “net delivered” mine price by state was much higher than the FOB mine price reported to ONRR. Headwaters concluded that the avoided federal royalties were huge. In its January Report, Headwaters calculated that using the “net delivered” price would

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6 Headwaters May Report at 19.

7 Ibid.
have resulted in increased federal royalties of $173 million annually,\(^8\) which it reduced to $139 million annually in its May Report.\(^9\)

There were many limitations regarding the EIA data which Headwaters relied upon in its January Report. EIA withheld the average transportation rates for many states due to confidentiality, so Headwaters had to rely on an incomplete data set to calculate an average. Further, the average transportation rates to the electric power sector could not be applied to the average delivered prices for industrial and export sales. Headwaters also used the average delivered coal price by state of destination for industrial customers, regardless of the origin of the coal, which resulted in an over-estimate of the price for Wyoming and Montana coal, which is much lower-cost per ton.

Headwaters relied upon a different approach to calculate the “net delivered” mine price in its May Report. Headwaters purchased data from SNL Energy, a private market information and analysis firm. SNL relies in part upon prices reported by electric power companies (both regulated and unregulated) to EIA on Form 923. For regulated electric power companies, SNL used the delivered prices reported by EIA and estimated the transportation costs for each transaction to calculate a “net delivered” mine price. For unregulated merchant power companies, EIA does not release the delivered coal price (due to confidentiality). SNL estimates both the mine price and the transportation costs for coal deliveries to these companies. Headwaters used the average mine price estimated by SNL for deliveries to domestic power companies from mines with federal coal leases to calculate the “net delivered” mine price for sales of federal coal by state.

In both the January and May reports, Headwaters concluded that the calculated “net delivered” mine prices were higher than the FOB mine prices reported to ONRR in the states of Wyoming and Montana (the states with the most federal coal production, measured by tons produced). Headwaters takes this result as evidence that there is a “loophole” which results in significant amounts of coal being resold (either by affiliates or independent brokers) at higher prices, thus avoiding paying federal royalties, amounting to a revenue loss of $139 million annually.

CPE commissioned this report to review Headwaters’ approach and data sources and to analyze whether an accurate and independent analysis of the data used by Headwaters does in fact

\(^8\) Headwaters January Report at 24 concluded that the increased royalties would have been $865 million higher over a five-year period.
demonstrate that coal is being sold for higher prices than reported to ONRR or whether the current system is working to determine the FOB mine price of coal sold from federal leases.

III. Conclusions

Based upon a review of the data, methodology and calculations used by Headwaters, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. There is no basis for Headwaters’ conclusion that a calculated “net delivered” mine price is higher than the FOB mine price producers report to ONRR. In fact, Headwaters’ own results show large inconsistencies, as its calculation of the “net delivered” mine price is lower than the price reported to ONRR for more than half of the states, as summarized on Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 1: Comparison of Average Mine Prices Reported to ONRR and Calculated by Headwaters for the Fiscal Years 2008 – 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Coal Sales (1000 tons)</th>
<th>Sales Value ($1000)</th>
<th>FOB Mine Price</th>
<th>Coal Receipts (1000 tons)</th>
<th>Netback Mine Price</th>
<th>Sales Volume</th>
<th>Mine Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>10,248</td>
<td>$522,148</td>
<td>$50.95</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>$65.13</td>
<td>-88%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>131,470</td>
<td>$5,520,508</td>
<td>$41.99</td>
<td>138,570</td>
<td>$41.73</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>$99,528</td>
<td>$78.39</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>$101.75</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>163,732</td>
<td>$2,484,234</td>
<td>$15.17</td>
<td>137,901</td>
<td>$21.84</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>30,853</td>
<td>$1,522,424</td>
<td>$49.34</td>
<td>82,412</td>
<td>$35.19</td>
<td>167%</td>
<td>-29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>19,747</td>
<td>$336,469</td>
<td>$17.04</td>
<td>158,484</td>
<td>$16.32</td>
<td>703%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>4,249</td>
<td>$216,008</td>
<td>$50.84</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>$28.93</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>83,542</td>
<td>$3,030,170</td>
<td>$36.27</td>
<td>112,036</td>
<td>$30.89</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>2,648,832</td>
<td>$33,574,705</td>
<td>$12.68</td>
<td>2,573,019</td>
<td>$15.50</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,093,943</strong></td>
<td><strong>$47,306,193</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,207,965</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18.05</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Headwaters wishes to focus only on the results for the states of Montana and Wyoming, where its calculations show a “net delivered” mine price higher than the FOB mine price reported to ONRR, explaining that:

“As a result, our results are only robust for states where a large majority of sales from mines with active federal leases are to the domestic power sector. This is true of Montana and Wyoming.”

However, the states of Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota and Utah all have a majority of sales to the domestic power sector, greater than the state of Montana, yet these are states where Headwaters’ calculated the “net delivered” mine prices to be lower than the prices

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10 Headwaters May Report, Tables 1 and 2.
reported to ONRR. While Wyoming is clearly the largest coal-producing state, the coal sales value reported to ONRR for coal produced in Colorado, New Mexico and Utah are similar in magnitude to Montana\(^{11}\) and the shares of sales to the domestic power sector are equal to or greater than Montana, as shown on Exhibit 2. The fact that Headwaters’ own calculations show that these states have “net delivered” prices lower than the prices reported to ONRR is clear evidence that the problem is Headwaters used poor data and performed a flawed analysis, not that the prices reported to ONRR do not reflect the accurate FOB mine price.

Exhibit 2: Share of 2013 Total Coal Production by State delivered to the Domestic Power Sector\(^ {12} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Production</th>
<th>Domestic Power Sales</th>
<th>Power Sector Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>18,620</td>
<td>4,137</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>24,236</td>
<td>14,413</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>80,380</td>
<td>60,375</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>42,231</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>21,969</td>
<td>21,867</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>27,639</td>
<td>21,543</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>16,977</td>
<td>12,587</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>387,924</td>
<td>373,505</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>621,112</td>
<td>533,964</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Headwaters made significant errors in its estimation of federal coal production, which distorted its results. As Exhibit 1 shows, Headwaters analysis did a poor job of matching the total tons sold from federal coal leases by state. Where Headwaters estimated that the sales volumes to domestic power companies were less than the actual coal production reported to ONRR, this could be explained by sales to non-power markets, which Headwaters could not calculate. However, for 5 of the 9 states which it analyzed, Headwaters calculated sales of federal coal to the domestic power sector to be greater than the actual total amount of coal produced, which demonstrates that there are problems with the quality of the data and

\(^{11}\) While Headwaters made the statement in its January Report that “Montana coal sales to domestic power plants account for 95.7 percent of sales over the period 2008 to 2012 (page 19), that is incorrect and refuted by the data in the same report on Tables B1 (207,705,922 tons produced) and B4 (157,090,721 tons sold to electric power sector, or 75.6%). This percentage declined in 2013 and 2014.

Headwaters’ analysis, rendering any conclusion unreliable. In some cases, the magnitude of the error is huge, 34% for Utah, 167% for New Mexico, and 703% for North Dakota. Even the 5% excess tonnage for Colorado is significant, given the large share of Colorado coal sales to industrial and export markets. This problem demonstrates that Headwaters’ analysis is not reliable and its conclusion that federal “royalty revenue could increase by $139 million annually”\textsuperscript{13} using “net delivered prices” is not supported by the analysis.

The failure to accurately assess the share of coal produced by mine from federal leases created a large error in Headwaters’ calculations. In the 2 states where Headwaters calculated higher “net delivered” mine prices than the average price of federal coal reported to ONRR (Montana and Wyoming), there are several large mine-mouth power plants (where the coal supply to the plant is dedicated from mines adjacent to the power plant). For these power plants, the FOB mine price and the delivered price is approximately (assumed to be exactly) the same amount per ton. While these plants have a low delivered price of coal, the FOB mine price is generally higher than the mine price received by mines which sell in the open market. The large mine-mouth plants in these states (Colstrip in Montana and Jim Bridger and Kemmerer in Wyoming) receive coal from mines which have “checkerboard” coal leases, which alternate between federal and private ownership. Thus, the assumption that these mines are 100% federal coal induced a large error in Headwaters’ analysis, biasing the average “net delivered” mine price for federal coal well above the average price for coal actually produced from federal leases in these states.

3. \textbf{The SNL “data” on coal sales prices FOB mine are not data, they are estimates, with large errors that distort the analysis.} In its May Report, Headwaters decided only to use data for coal sold to the domestic electric power sector because data for these sales are more readily available. In order to calculate the “net delivered” mine price, Headwaters relied upon a database of coal deliveries to the electric power sector which it purchased from SNL Financial, Inc. (“SNL”), which is a news and information service. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) collects data on Form 923 from power generators on their fuel purchases, either monthly (for plants over 200 MW) or annually (for smaller plants). EIA collects data on the coal deliveries, including the tons received, the coal quality, and the commodity price, both delivered and FOB mine. However, due to confidentiality, EIA does

\textsuperscript{13} Id at 13.
not release the FOB mine price and, for unregulated power generators, does not release the delivered coal price either. For regulated utility generators, SNL provides its own estimates of the FOB mine price by relying upon the delivered prices reported by the utilities and released by EIA, less SNL’s own estimates of the transportation costs from the mine to the plant.\footnote{In its May report, Headwaters stated that “Transportation costs are reported for regulated utilities in the U.S. by the Energy Information Administration. Where these costs are not reported, SNL energy estimates transportation costs based on waybill samples from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Surface Transportation Board.” (Headwaters May Report at 21). This statement is not correct, or is misleading at best. Because of confidentiality, EIA does not release or report the transportation rates for any coal delivery for any power plant or any mine, whether regulated or unregulated. EIA does publish an annual report providing the total transportation cost for coal by state of origin to state of destination, by subtracting the reported commodity price from the reported delivered price. However, even these data are redacted by EIA for many of the origin-destination state combinations for confidentiality to prevent users from doing the calculations which Headwaters performed. While Headwaters used this annual report in its January report, SNL does not use any EIA data on actual transportation costs in its database. SNL estimates the transportation costs for all coal deliveries, not just those for unregulated companies.} For unregulated plants, SNL does not use the reported delivered price (which is not released by EIA) less estimated transportation costs to estimate the FOB mine price. Instead, SNL uses the delivered price for all coal delivered to each destination state reported by EIA (where it is not withheld to protect confidentiality for unregulated power companies) and deducts the estimated transportation costs to calculate the FOB mine price.\footnote{SNL, “Coal Transportation Rate Methodology” at \url{https://www.snl.com/help/HelpFile/Coal_Transportation.htm}}

The estimated mine prices reported by SNL have large errors and cannot be relied upon for the purpose of determining the “net delivered” mine price as an alternative to the prices reported by the coal lessors to ONRR. For example, the state for which Headwaters found the largest discrepancy between the reported price to ONRR and its “net delivered” mine price calculation was Montana, which was one of only two states where Headwaters found a “problem” where its calculated “net delivered” price was higher than the reported FOB mine price (Headwaters’ price calculation was 44% above the average price reported to ONRR as shown on Exhibit 1). The largest consumer of Montana coal is the mine-mouth Colstrip power plant. In calendar year 2014, the mine-mouth Colstrip plant reported receipts of 8,752,704 tons on the EIA Form 923 out of a total of 29,811,530 tons of reported receipts of Montana coal (29.4%).\footnote{EIA Form 923, “EIA923_Schedules_2_3_4_5_M_12_2014_Data_Early_Release.xls” at \url{http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/}} However, EIA does not release the average price of coal delivered to Colstrip because the operator and partial owner of the plant is an unregulated generator (Talen Energy). SNL estimated the delivered price to Colstrip (with the same mine price as...
transportation costs were assumed to be zero) to be $37.76 per ton in 2014 and $37.65 per ton in 2013.\textsuperscript{17} However, other public sources are available to determine an accurate delivered coal price. One of the plant owners, Puget Sound Energy, is a regulated utility who owns 50% of units 1-2 and 25% of units 3-4. Puget, like other regulated utilities, files an annual report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the FERC Form 1) which provides the delivered coal price to the Colstrip power plant. Calculating the total delivered price for the Colstrip station from the FERC Form 1 yields delivered prices of $24.49 per ton and $25.69 per ton in 2014 and 2013, respectively. Thus, SNL’s estimate of the “net delivered” mine price for 29% of all Montana coal was about 50% above the actual reported prices to FERC.

This huge error by SNL, combined with the fact that Headwaters mistakenly assumed that 100% of the production at the Rosebud mine was federal coal, is the primary reason that Headwaters’ calculation of the “net delivered” coal price for Montana coal is far above the actual average sales prices reported to ONRR.\textsuperscript{18}

4. **The proposed changes to the methodology for valuing federal coal for royalty purposes suggested by Headwaters are neither “transparent” nor “efficient”**. Headwaters asserts that: “Changing the price used for valuation to net delivered prices has multiple advantages over using the first arm’s-length sale price….Using net delivered price has significant transparency advantages, and similar benefits to streamline the assessment process for industry and ONRR compliance audits.”\textsuperscript{19} These claims are not supported by Headwaters’ own analysis. Headwaters process was anything but transparent:

- Headwaters did not rely upon public data, but rather purchased data from a private service (SNL Financial) not available to the public;

\textsuperscript{17} SNL Briefing Book, Colstrip Power Plant at https://www.snl.com/interactivex/FuelContractDetail.aspx?Period=2014&Q=0&ExpM=0&FCT=-1&FT=-1&MSt=Any&MPR=1&IsBuyer=1&Region=0&HC=4062485&ID=2449&Type=2&lV=4&lViewBy=1&PP=2449&updYear=1&updOther=0

\textsuperscript{18} Of course, ONRR has access to the actual coal contracts and sales prices from the Rosebud mine to the Colstrip plant. In fact, the Department of Interior audited the sales price to the Colstrip plant and brought litigation against Western Energy (the Westmoreland Coal subsidiary which owns the Rosebud mine) which it successfully settled to receive royalties on the payment for conveyor transportation costs to Colstrip. See Westmoreland Coal SEC Form 8-K at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/106455/000095012309022460/0000950123-09-022460-index.htm.

\textsuperscript{19} Headwaters May Report at 19.
• The database used by Headwaters did not cover all coal sales, just sales to electric power companies, which were only about 80% of U.S. coal production in 2013;\(^ {20}\)
• EIA only reports delivered prices for plants owned by regulated electric utilities, which excluded 27% of all coal purchases by electric power companies reported to EIA in 2014;\(^ {21}\)
• EIA does not disclose the FOB mine price for any sales transaction due to confidentiality, so all of the prices relied upon by Headwaters were estimates, not actual sales prices;
• The EIA data on electric power coal purchases is not released promptly; the 2013 calendar year final data was released on March 10, 2015, hardly an efficient source of information;
• The mine price estimates used by Headwaters were not performed by an official government entity, like ONRR, or a regulated entity with legal reporting obligations, but rather by an unofficial private service with no demonstrated reliability; and,
• Headwaters itself was not transparent in its report; it has not released the data which it used or the calculations which it performed, but rather just a couple of tables summarizing 7 years of data and analysis.

Headwaters states that “Additional price data is revealed by sales on spot markets, and by market index prices for coal of varying qualities delivered to domestic and export markets.”\(^ {22}\) These are exactly the price benchmarks which ONRR has proposed to eliminate for use in valuation of non-arm’s-length transactions, due to claims by Headwaters and others that these prices do not properly value the actual sales price received by lessees. While market index prices for coal sales on the over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets are good indicators of current market prices, they are not as accurate as the actual sales contract prices reported to ONRR, which provide the prices received on the actual coal shipments.

5. **Headwaters has no basis to speculate that there is a large “loophole” exploited by affiliates and unnamed “brokers” to avoid royalty payments.** Headwaters asserts that “current subsidies in the regulation and marketing loopholes due to royalty valuation policy were worth about $850 million between 2008 and 2012.”\(^ {23}\) Headwaters describes this “loophole” to be the fact that proceeds for the resale of coal by affiliate marketing companies or

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\(^ {21}\) EIA Form 923, “EIA923_Schedules_2_3_4_5_M_12_2014_Data_Early_Release.xls” at [http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/](http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/)

\(^ {22}\) Headwaters May Report at 19.

\(^ {23}\) Headwaters January Report at 25.
independent “brokers” are not subject to royalties on their gains (Headwaters does not mention the possibility of losses on resale). Headwaters accuses the coal companies of deliberately underpaying royalties by using affiliated marketing companies, stating: “For example, companies have arguably exploited a loophole that allows mines to transfer coal for low mine prices to affiliates who then remarket coal to consumers at the higher full commodity value of the coal.”

Headwaters acknowledges at one point that the proposed changes by ONRR would close the “loophole” for affiliated marketing companies: “The net delivered price and the first arm’s-length sale price are the same price for all sales where mines and their affiliates are marketing coal directly to consumers. In these instances, the contract value reveals the price that would be used for royalty valuation.” However, Headwaters contradicts this conclusion when it states that: “ONRR’s assessment that proposed reforms would not generate additional revenue suggests arm’s length price reforms would not effectively close the “affiliate” loophole. This is at least partially due to the fact that the loophole would remain open for independent brokers.”

Headwaters performed no analysis of the role of independent brokers (more properly called trading companies) which purchase coal FOB mine from producers and resell the coal to ultimate customers, hoping to make a profit. Nevertheless, Headwaters alleges that these transactions are generating huge profits creating a “loophole” to avoid paying royalties. Headwaters’ May report asserts that federal royalties would increase by $139 million annually by using the “net delivered” mine price instead of the reported FOB mine price, which would imply that the profit margins for the coal trading companies must be over $1.1 billion annually (at a 12.5% royalty rate). Our analysis of the EIA 923 data reported by the electric power companies shows that the claim that brokers play a large role in the ultimate sale of coal to consumers is false.

The power companies report the name of the coal supplier for each monthly purchase as well as the mine which is the source of the coal (EIA provides the reporting companies with a dropdown list of mines to select using the ID number assigned by the Mine Safety and Health Administration, or “MSHA”). The 2014 EIA 923 data reports 29,887,563 tons of coal delivered from the state of Montana and 389,217,875 tons from the state of Wyoming. None of the

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25 Id at 19.
26 Id at 2.
27 Ibid.
deliveries from the state of Montana had an unknown MSHA ID and only 210,799 tons from Wyoming (0.05%) had an unknown ID (meaning that the customer did not know what mine the coal origin). For the Montana coal deliveries, the supplier name reported by the buyers was the coal producing company for all but 252,982 tons (0.8%) sold by third parties (C. Reiss, Traxenergy and the City of Marquette) and 890,461 tons (3.0%) sold to Consumers Power by Venture Fuels, an affiliate of Cloud Peak Energy which has a separate royalty agreement with ONRR to account for affiliate sales. As the affiliate sales issue is being addressed by the current review underway by ONRR, only the miniscule amount of third-party sales (0.8%) could possibly be sales by “brokers” who are profiting by the resale of coal and not paying federal royalties on the sales margin. For deliveries of Wyoming coal, only 6,611,617 tons (1.7%) were identified as coming from suppliers who were not the companies which owned the mine which was the origin of the coal. One third-party supplier sold most of this coal (Twin Eagle Resource Management²⁸ – 4,687,125 tons) and 4 other sales companies sold between 100,000 and 500,000 tons (Peabody CoalTrade, Cargill, C. Reiss and Robindale/RES Coal). Another 3 power companies (NRG, Alliant and Luminant) resold a total of 422,721 tons, while the remaining 214,795 tons were sold by 6 trading companies.

These very small amounts of coal re-sold by trading companies and power customers can have no meaningful impact on the calculation of the average sales price used to determine federal coal royalties. Coal trading plays a very small role in the markets for Montana and Wyoming coal and has an equal probability of losses as it does of profits. Most coal trades are to balance monthly shipments and production. Most independent coal trading companies have ended participation in the OTC market for Powder River Basin coal, as the markets have little liquidity or volatility which are needed to support a trading business.

6. The current valuation system is already “transparent” to the only entity that matters – ONRR. Headwaters wants “transparency” for “public review of federal royalty valuation”²⁹, for which the only purpose is for the public to check if ONRR is doing its job properly. ONRR currently has complete “transparency” for review of every coal sale made by a lessee, including sales to affiliates and “brokers”, which Headwaters alleges are taking advantage of a “loophole” in the valuation process. ONRR is an agency which is entrusted by Congress to

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²⁸ Twin Eagle acquired an energy trading company previously known as Enserco and the total includes sales reported as both Twin Eagle and Enserco.
²⁹ Ibid.
perform this task and it is subject to outside audit by an Inspector General and the General Accounting Office. There is no reason to suppose these agencies are not doing their job and Headwaters’ unsupported claims to not make its implications of malfeasance credible. Headwaters acknowledges that “contract prices, mining and marketing costs” of the lessees are proprietary data properly kept confidential, yet wants the general public to be able to duplicate all of these proprietary sales transactions to check ONRR’s work. This is like asserting that the public should be able to review individual income tax returns to check whether the Internal Revenue Service is doing its job properly.

IV. Analysis of Montana Coal Sales Prices for Mines with Federal Leases

Headwaters alleges that the average coal price reported to ONRR for the states of Montana and Wyoming are below the average mine price for these states calculated from the SNL data for mines with federal coal leases. In particular, Headwaters claimed that the actual FOB mine price for coal sold from federal leases in Montana was 44% higher than the average price reported to ONRR over the 7 year period covering Fiscal Years 2008 – 2014.

In order to test the validity of Headwaters analysis and the data which it used, we have performed a detailed analysis of its calculations of the Montana “net delivered” coal price, where it alleges the largest discrepancy with the ONRR data. We have analyzed the SNL data sources and methodology used by Headwaters to understand what the reasons were for this very large difference between the prices reported to ONRR and Headwater’s “net delivered” mine price. Specifically, our questions were:

1) Is the difference in reported prices due to downstream profits realized by affiliated marketing companies and independent brokers, as alleged by Headwaters’ or,

2) Is the difference in reported prices due to problems with the data and analysis and is there any difference once these problems are identified and corrected?

Replication of Headwaters Data and Analysis

Headwaters did not provide any detail as to the data which it relied upon and they aggregated the data across all deliveries and a period of 7 fiscal years. In order to perform a detailed analysis of all of the Montana coal shipments from federal leases, we had to recreate Headwaters’ analysis.

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30 Ibid.
using the methodology and data sources which were described in Appendix A to the May Report.

31 Specifically, the process described by Headwaters, which we repeated, was:

1. Use all monthly coal deliveries to the electric power sector for the period October 2007 to September 2014 (fiscal years which correspond to the ONRR data). These data were downloaded from SNL Financial in a database. The SNL data is the EIA Form 923 data, with SNL adding estimates for transportation costs and FOB mine prices (as well as delivered prices for unregulated generators which EIA does not disclose). In order to provide a detailed analysis by coal mine, we recreated the analysis for Fiscal Year 2014.

2. Match the data for all coal shipments originating from the state of Montana with the mine origin by MSHA ID number as reported on the SNL database. All of the records for Montana coal deliveries in 2014 had an MSHA ID number assigned to the delivery.

3. Calculate the average coal prices FOB mine and delivered by mine.

Following the same methodology as Headwaters, we have reproduced the same results. The average mine price for Montana coal in Fiscal Year 2014 for mines with federal leases using Headwaters’ data and methodology is shown on Exhibit 3. The apparent weighted average FOB mine price for all coal sales to the domestic power sector calculated using Headwaters’ methodology was $28.38 per ton. For the same Fiscal Year 2014, the average price reported to ONRR was $17.18 per ton, confirming the very large difference found by Headwaters for the average over 7 years.

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31 Headwaters declined our request to share their calculations and underlying data and has only produced a table showing the totals for the 7-year period. However, we have reproduced their calculations for the 7-year period as well as for each fiscal year.
Exhibit 3: Calculation of Average Mine Price for Montana Federal Coal Leases, FY 2014 Using Headwaters Data and Methodology\textsuperscript{32}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT Mine</th>
<th>% Federal Lease</th>
<th>All Deliveries (000 tons)</th>
<th>Federal Deliveries</th>
<th>Delivered Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>Transportation Cost ($/ton)</th>
<th>All Deliveries (000 tons)</th>
<th>Federal Delivered Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>FOB Cost ($/Ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absaloka</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$37.43</td>
<td>$20.57</td>
<td>14,422</td>
<td>$16.86</td>
<td>$16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decker</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>$30.46</td>
<td>$17.71</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>$12.74</td>
<td>$12.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosebud</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>$38.03</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>$38.03</td>
<td>$38.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>$25.17</td>
<td>$5.38</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>$19.79</td>
<td>$19.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Peak</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>$77.87</td>
<td>$26.07</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>$51.80</td>
<td>$51.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Creek</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>$36.06</td>
<td>$20.03</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>$16.02</td>
<td>$16.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>71%</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,262</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,422</strong></td>
<td><strong>$37.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8.84</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,427</strong></td>
<td><strong>$25.06</strong></td>
<td><strong>$28.38</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Price Reported to ONRR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$17.18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Error #1: Correction for the SNL Data Error for the Colstrip Power Plant**

The largest customer for Montana coal delivered to the electric power sector is the Colstrip power plant. Colstrip is a mine-mouth plant located adjacent to the Rosebud coal mine and the coal is delivered by conveyor belt. All of the coal deliveries shown on Exhibit 3 from the Rosebud mine are to the Colstrip power plant, with $0.00 per ton transportation cost. The very high mine price reported by SNL of $38.03 for this one mine and plant is the major reason why the SNL/Headwaters mine average price is far above the price reported to ONRR.

The SNL price estimate for the Colstrip plant is wrong. Because the Colstrip plant is operated by a merchant generator, EIA does not publish the delivered coal price to preserve confidentiality. For merchant plants, SNL’s procedure is to use the average delivered coal price for all coal (regardless of origin) delivered to the state reported by EIA in the Electric Power Monthly.\textsuperscript{33} However, EIA withholds the average delivered coal price by state for independent power producers (merchant generators) where there are not enough power plants who report monthly data to prevent analysts from discovering the delivered price. EIA did not publish a monthly delivered coal price for the state of Montana in 2013 or 2014.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, the price estimated by SNL for Colstrip is far above the actual price for coal delivered to Colstrip.


\textsuperscript{33} Personal communication from Steve Piper, Director, Energy Research, SNL Energy on September 9, 2015.

\textsuperscript{34} EIA, “Electric Power Monthly”, Table 4.10. [http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/](http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/)
There are other public sources of data which provide reliable estimates of the delivered cost of coal purchased by power plants. One of these sources is the Form 1, an annual report filed by regulated electric utilities with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). The Colstrip plant is co-owned by both regulated and unregulated power companies. The largest regulated owner is Puget Sound Energy, who owns 50% of Colstrip units 1-2 and 25% of units 3-4. Puget reports its cost of coal delivered to Colstrip units 1-2 and units 3-4 by calendar year.

While EIA does not report the monthly delivered price for independent power producers in Montana on the Electric Power Monthly, EIA does provide the average annual delivered coal price to all power plants in the state of Montana by coal type (subbituminous and lignite). Colstrip is by far the largest power plant in Montana and it receives 86% - 91% of the total subbituminous coal delivered to Montana each year. As a result, the annual reported delivered price for subbituminous coal to Montana is a close approximation of the (undisclosed) delivered price to Colstrip.

A comparison of the quantity and prices reported by SNL compared to the FERC Form 1 and EIA Montana data is shown on Exhibit 4. In most years, SNL’s estimate of the delivered price to Colstrip (which is the same as the Rosebud mine price) is far above the FERC and EIA data. The FERC and EIA data are very similar, reflecting the fact that these are accurate reported data sources, with the small differences due to the fact that EIA includes all subbituminous coal delivered to Montana, not just Colstrip.
Exhibit 4: Comparison of Delivered Coal Prices for the Colstrip Plant\textsuperscript{35}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**FERC Form 1 Data**

- **Tons Burned**
  - Colstrip 1-2: 50% 1,391,673 1,446,801 1,469,911 1,214,793 905,093 1,444,314 1,338,220
  - Colstrip 3-4: 25% 1,884,759 1,338,982 1,785,698 1,430,462 1,509,826 1,267,303 1,527,867
  - **Total**

- **Delivered Price /ton**
  - Colstrip 1-2: $15.86 $17.40 $21.75 $29.40 $37.15 $29.52 $29.32
  - **Average**

**EIA Average Delivered Price of Subbituminous Coal to Montana**

- **Tons received** 11,755,720 9,348,457 11,287,200 9,422,469 8,560,170 8,969,928
- **Delivered price /ton** $16.56 $17.89 $18.44 $22.31 $23.43 $26.64

**SNL Energy Data**

- **Tons received** 10,654,144 8,081,926 10,077,757 8,405,469 7,754,748 7,953,774 8,752,704
- **Delivered price /ton** $25.30 $21.69 $25.92 $23.29 $24.94 $37.65 $37.76

**Difference in Reported Prices ($/ton)**

- FERC vs. EIA $(0.38) $0.22 $(0.23) $1.29 $0.46 $(0.95)
- SNL vs. FERC $9.12 $3.58 $7.71 $(0.31) $1.05 $11.96 $13.27
- SNL vs. EIA $8.74 $3.80 $7.48 $0.98 $1.51 $11.01

Correcting the large mistake in the SNL data for coal sales from the Rosebud mine substantially reduces the difference between the calculated “net delivered” price for coal sales to the power sector and the price reported to ONRR for Montana coal sales in FY 2014 as shown on Exhibit 5.

Exhibit 5: Calculation of Average Mine Price for Montana Federal Coal Leases, FY 2014 Using Headwaters Data Corrected for Colstrip Price

Corrected Delivered Price for Rosebud Mine to Colstrip Power Plant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT Mine</th>
<th>% Federal Lease</th>
<th>Deliveries (000 tons)</th>
<th>Deliveries Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>Transportation Cost ($/ton)</th>
<th>All Deliveries Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>Federal Coal Price ($/ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absaloka</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$37.43</td>
<td>$20.57</td>
<td>$16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decker</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>$30.46</td>
<td>$17.71</td>
<td>$12.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosebud</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>$25.17</td>
<td>$5.38</td>
<td>$19.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Peak</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>$77.87</td>
<td>$26.07</td>
<td>$51.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Creek</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>$36.06</td>
<td>$20.03</td>
<td>$16.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>20,262</td>
<td>14,422</td>
<td>$29.91</td>
<td>$8.84</td>
<td>$21.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Price Reported to ONRR 21,427

Error #2: Correction for Missing SNL Data

Headwaters relied upon SNL data to estimate the average mine price for Montana coal. The SNL data only includes coal sales to the domestic power sector, which only accounts for 59.2% of Montana coal sales, as shown on Exhibit 2 earlier. However, SNL does not even include all of the sales to the electric power sector. SNL excluded almost all sales to the second-largest customer of Montana coal, Detroit Edison (“DTE”), because DTE reported the coal delivered to the common storage area for the Belle River and St. Clair power plants (reported on the EIA Form 923 as “BRSC Shared Storage”), rather than to the plants themselves. Also, the 2014 SNL data used by Headwaters does not include coal deliveries to plants (Stanton, Hoot Lake, and Savage) which only report annually, rather than monthly. As a result, the SNL data used by Headwaters only included 47.3% of the Montana sales to the electric power sector in FY 2014, as shown on Exhibit 6.

Exhibit 6: Total Montana Coal Production and Sales to the Power Sector Reported by SNL, FY 2014 (1000 tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>Total Produced</th>
<th>SNL Data</th>
<th>Percent Reported</th>
<th>Detroit Edison</th>
<th>Annual Reporting</th>
<th>Corrected Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absaloka</td>
<td>6,416</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decker</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosebud</td>
<td>8,232</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savage</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Peak</td>
<td>7,501</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Creek</td>
<td>17,014</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3,968</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>10,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,811</td>
<td>20,262</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>27,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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36 Personal communication from Steve Piper, Director, SNL Energy on September 9, 2015.
37 Total production from MSHA Form 7000-2 data; sales missing from SNL from EIA Form 923.
All of the Montana coal sales to DTE, Stanton and Hoot Lake came from the Decker and Spring Creek mines, which had the SNL’s lowest reported “net delivered” mine prices in Montana. By excluding these coal sales, the net result was to increase the weighted average price for Montana coal sales.

The price for the missing coal sales data to DTE can be determined from the reported delivered prices on EIA Form 923 and the average FOB mine price for Decker from the reported financial statements for Cloud Peak Energy (“CPE”). CPE owned 50% of Decker Coal Company until it sold this share to its partner, Ambre Energy (now renamed Lighthouse Resources) on September 12, 2014. CPE published the financial statements for Decker in its quarterly filings with the SEC as footnote 22 to its consolidated financial statements in its Form 10-Q (supplemental guarantor/non-guarantor financial statements). The statement of operations for CPE’s non-guarantor subsidiaries is the Decker financial results. The quarterly operating revenues and income statements for Fiscal Year 2014 for Decker Coal Company and the average sales price are shown on Exhibit 7.

Exhibit 7: Decker Coal Financial Statements and Sales Prices FY 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013 Q4</th>
<th>2014 Q1</th>
<th>2014 Q2</th>
<th>2014 Q3</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>$6,805</td>
<td>$3,965</td>
<td>$5,592</td>
<td>$6,095</td>
<td>$22,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs and expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of product sold</td>
<td>5,690</td>
<td>5,174</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>5,932</td>
<td>23,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation and depletion</td>
<td>(5,939)</td>
<td>(218)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(929)</td>
<td>(7,108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accretion</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>3,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>207</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>7,730</td>
<td>5,774</td>
<td>19,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating income</td>
<td>6,598</td>
<td>(2,007)</td>
<td>(2,138)</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>2,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons sold</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These average sales prices were used for the sales price to DTE, since DTE sales accounted for 77% of the total Decker sales. Using the reported delivered price from the EIA Form 923 and the Decker sales price FOB mine allowed the calculation of the freight costs from Decker to DTE. These freight costs were applied to the receipts reported by DTE from the Spring Creek mine to estimate the FOB mine price for Spring Creek sales to DTE for the same period. The “net

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delivered” prices for sales to plants which had reported freight costs by SNL in prior years was determined by using the prior SNL freight estimates. Adjusting the SNL data used by Headwaters for the sales which were missing from the SNL database results in a lower average price for Montana coal sales, as shown on Exhibit 8. The average sales price for FY 2014 is just $0.61 per ton higher than the price reported to ONRR.

Exhibit 8: Average Mine Price for Montana Federal Coal Leases, FY 2014 Using Headwaters Data Corrected for Colstrip Price and Missing SNL Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT Mine</th>
<th>% Federal Lease</th>
<th>Deliveries (000 tons)</th>
<th>Federal Leases Delivered Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>Transportation Cost ($/ton)</th>
<th>All Deliveries FOB Cost ($/Ton)</th>
<th>Federal Coal FOB Cost ($/Ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absaloka</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$37.43</td>
<td>$20.57</td>
<td>$16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decker</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>$38.10</td>
<td>$24.08</td>
<td>$13.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosebud</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>$25.17</td>
<td>$5.38</td>
<td>$19.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Peak</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>$77.87</td>
<td>$26.07</td>
<td>$51.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Creek</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17,191</td>
<td>17,191</td>
<td>$28.11</td>
<td>$13.50</td>
<td>$14.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>83%</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,798</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,958</strong></td>
<td><strong>$28.59</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11.01</strong></td>
<td><strong>$17.79</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Price Reported to ONRR</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,427</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$17.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Error #3: Correction for the Share of Montana Coal Production from Federal Leases

In its analysis, Headwaters assumed that any mine which had a federal coal lease had all of its production from federal coal. This assumption is false. None of these mines produces exclusively from federal leases. These mines have state leases and private leases also. For federal lands, 1 out of every 18 sections is owned by the state. Because the mines which have a higher FOB mine price (Signal Peak and Rosebud) have a lower share of coal produced from federal leases, Headwaters’ assumption that all of the coal from these mines was produced from federal coal leads Headwaters to calculate a higher average mine price than would be calculated using the correct share of coal production from federal leases.39

The Signal Peak (Bull Mountains) mine only acquired its first federal lease on June 1, 2012.40 As shown in the environmental assessment prepared in support of this lease, Signal Peak’s mine plan

39 Consistent with Headwaters’ calculations, the Absaloka mine produces no federal coal (it is 100% Indian coal).
would not produce coal from the new federal lease until the end of 2014, so none of the Signal Peak coal production was from federal coal during the entire period studied by Headwaters from 2008 to 2014. As this is the highest-priced coal in Montana, this assumption caused Headwaters to overstate the average Montana coal price throughout the period.

Headwaters has also overstated the amount of federal coal produced from the Rosebud mine, which has the second-highest coal sales price in Montana. The Rosebud mine has “checkerboard” coal leases, with alternating sections leased from the federal government and a private entity (Natural Resource Partners (“NRP”), which acquired the Burlington Northern railroad coal properties). NRP shows the extent of its coal leases at the Westmoreland Rosebud mine (“Western Energy”) in its 10-K, as shown on Exhibit 9.

**Exhibit 9: NRP Coal Leases at the Rosebud Mine**

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The share of coal produced at the Rosebud mine from its federal leases can be estimated from the amount of leased coal production reported by NRP. For FY 2014, NRP reported leased coal production of 2,385,000 tons out of 8,232,258 tons total production.\footnote{Natural Resource Partners, SEC Forms 10-Q 2013 and 2014 and 2013 Form 10-K.} Assuming the remainder of the coal was 17/18 federal coal and the remainder state leases (Westmoreland reports that the mine has state leases\footnote{Westmoreland Coal Company, SEC Form 10-K, 2014, page 13.}), the federal coal share at Rosebud was 67%. Cloud Peak reported that the 2014 coal production at the Spring Creek mine was 78% federal coal (the remainder was from state leases).\footnote{Personal communication from Tom Nelson, August 28, 2015.} We have estimated the shares of federal production from Decker to be 94% (federal and state leases) and from Savage to be 50% (mostly private coal).

Correcting the production for the share of coal produced from federal leases, the total federal production and the average mine price are very close to the values reported by ONRR (within $0.06 per ton), as shown on Exhibit 10. Thus, properly analyzed, the “net delivered” mine prices for Montana coal do not show any additional revenues which are not subject to royalties, as alleged by Headwaters.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT Mine</th>
<th>% Federal Lease</th>
<th>Deliveries (000 tons)</th>
<th>Federal Leases Delivered Price ($/ton)</th>
<th>Transportation Cost ($/ton)</th>
<th>All Deliveries FOB Cost ($/Ton)</th>
<th>Federal Coal FOB Cost ($/Ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absaloka</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$37.43</td>
<td>$20.57</td>
<td>$16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decker</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>$38.10</td>
<td>$24.08</td>
<td>$13.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosebud</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>5,344</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$24.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savage</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>$25.17</td>
<td>$5.38</td>
<td>$19.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Peak</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$77.87</td>
<td>$26.07</td>
<td>$51.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Creek</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>17,191</td>
<td>13,409</td>
<td>$28.11</td>
<td>$13.50</td>
<td>$14.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>34,798</td>
<td>22,088</td>
<td>$28.74</td>
<td>$11.72</td>
<td>$17.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Price Reported to ONRR</td>
<td>21,427</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$17.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. SNL’s Estimates of Freight Costs Overstate the Net Mine Price

The predicate of Headwaters’ use of SNL’s mine price data is that SNL provides an accurate estimate of the “net delivered price” to the electric power sector (the delivered price reported by the power companies on EIA Form 923 less the cost of freight).\footnote{The SNL data does not include sales to industrial customers or export markets at all.} However, SNL’s methodology...
persistently and significantly under-estimates the difference between the reported delivered price and the mine price, leading SNL to over-estimate the FOB mine price. **Once the problems with SNL’s estimates are corrected, there is no basis to conclude that the FOB mine prices reported to ONRR are less than the actual price at which the coal is sold.**

EIA collects data on the cost and quality of fuels on Form 923. For the cost of coal, Form 923 collects two types of cost data: the total delivered cost and the commodity cost for each delivery of coal every month. The reporting instructions for the Form 923 define these costs as follows:

- **“Total Delivered Cost (all fuels):** Enter the delivered cost of the fuel in cents per million Btu (MMBtu) to the nearest 0.1 cent. Include all costs incurred in the purchase and delivery of the fuel to the plant. Do not include adjustments associated with prior months’ fuel costs....For coal, include maintenance and depreciation costs of coal delivered in railcars owned by the plant. Do not include unloading costs.”

- **“Commodity Cost (for coal, petroleum coke, and natural gas):** Report the cost (in cents per million Btu rounded to the nearest 0.1 cent) at the point of first loading (free on board mine or transportation pipeline (FOB)), including taxes and quality-related charges or credits. Do not include loading and unloading charges, dust proofing, freeze conditioning, switching charges, diesel fuel surcharges, pipeline charges, transportation charges, or any other charges relating to the movement of the fuel to the point of use.”

While EIA collects the FOB mine price data for each coal delivery to the electric power sector, it does not disclose the FOB mine price for these sales, or even the delivered price for coal receipts at nonutility (merchant) power plants. Thus, SNL must estimate the FOB mine prices using the delivered cost for regulated power plants. For unregulated power plants, SNL uses the average delivered coal price for all coal deliveries by destination state, published by EIA in the Electric Power Monthly.

SNL’s methodology to estimate the FOB mine price is to take the reported “total delivered cost” (converted from cents per million Btu to dollars per ton) and to subtract an estimated transportation cost (in dollars per ton). For Montana and Wyoming coal, the vast majority of the coal is shipped by rail (with some coal transferred from rail to barge, vessel or truck for final delivery). SNL describes its transportation cost estimation methodology for estimating rail transportation rates as follows:

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48 Id, page 38.
• Collect data from the Public Use Waybill file, which has a time lag of two years, which reveals the rail rate charged by origin area and termination area.\textsuperscript{49}

• Based upon the billed freight revenue and billed weight, calculate the rail rate per ton of coal and the route length in miles.

• Derive a formula of rail rate per ton-mile as a function of rail distance for all of the annual Waybill data.

• Estimate the rail rate for each shipment based on the mileage of the rail distance.

• Adjust the rail rate quarterly based upon the changes in the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor filed with the Association of American Railroads and changes in fuel surcharges reported by the railroads.

What is clear is that the “total delivered cost” which EIA requires to be reported on the Form 923 includes costs beyond the commodity price FOB mine and the rail rate charged by the rail carrier. As is stated in EIA’s instructions, the total delivered cost includes the following items specifically excluded from the FOB mine cost, which are not included in the rail rates reported by the rail carriers on the Waybill data:

• Maintenance and depreciation costs for railcars owned by the plant (which includes virtually all customers purchasing Montana and Wyoming coal);

• Sales taxes charged by many states on the cost of coal (at a minimum the states with sales taxes on the cost of coal include Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana and Washington); and,

• Freeze conditioning and dust proofing additives.

SNL does not subtract these costs in estimating the FOB mine price and therefore systematically overstates the FOB mine price in its database (even if all of its rail rate estimation methodology were accurate).

This systematic error can be shown by a comparison of the SNL transportation estimates with a report published by EIA annually on the coal transportation costs by state of origin to state of destination. While Headwaters relied upon this EIA study in its January Report (Appendix B) and referred to the EIA study in its May Report\textsuperscript{50}, Headwaters relied upon the SNL data in its May

\textsuperscript{49} The areas are the Bureau of Economic Analysis Economic Area.

\textsuperscript{50} Headwaters May Report, footnote 12, at 8.
Report, not the EIA data, and never compared the results of the EIA transportation data with the SNL data. We have made this comparison.

The EIA study calculated the transportation costs by subtracting the reported commodity price FOB mine from the total delivered costs. For reasons of confidentiality, EIA did not disclose the detailed data, but aggregated the data by state of origin, state of destination, and primary mode of shipment (rail, barge or truck). EIA even withheld many of the state origin-destination pairs to preserve confidentiality for individual customers, where states had few customers purchasing coal from a state. Thus, the EIA data included all costs reported in the total delivered price, including taxes, rail cars and other costs, which SNL did not include. We have calculated the average transportation costs reported by SNL for coal originating in Wyoming and Montana by state of destination with the EIA reported costs for the same shipments for the years 2008 – 2012 (the only years reported by EIA). Exhibit 11 shows the results of this analysis.
Including only the data not withheld by EIA for confidentiality, this comparison shows that SNL’s estimate of transportation costs was significantly below EIA’s data for almost all states in almost all years. For the period 2008 – 2012, the weighted average difference for Wyoming coal was $2.02 per ton and for Montana coal was $3.08 per ton. This error means that Headwaters overstated the “net delivered” mine prices for these states by this amount, which explains almost the entire difference in prices for Wyoming coal reported to ONRR compared to Headwaters’ calculation. Headwaters incorrectly attributed the price difference to “marketing

51 EVA analysis of SNL data downloaded from SNL’s website, adjusted to constant 2012 dollars to match the EIA data, and EIA, “Coal Transportation Rates to the Electric Power Sector”, Tables 4a, 4b and 4c. http://www.eia.gov/coal/transportationrates/
margins” which affiliated and non-affiliated brokers earned on remarketing federal coal at higher prices and avoiding royalties.52

VI. Experience and Qualifications

EVA is a market research and analysis company which was founded in 1981. EVA specializes in market analysis of the North American energy markets, including coal, natural gas, oil, and electric power. EVA’s clients include producers, consumers and transporters of coal, as well as investors and banks. EVA also performs market analyses for federal administrative and regulatory agencies, such as the Energy Information Administration and the Office of Surface Mining as well as state agencies such as public utility commissions.

The primary author of this report is Mr. Seth Schwartz, president of EVA. EVA has been performing analyses of U.S. energy markets since its founding in 1981. EVA analyzes and publishes regular reports on the coal, natural gas and power markets, including forecasts of supply, demand and prices. Mr. Schwartz leads EVA’s practice analyzing U.S. coal markets. He has testified as an expert witness on coal markets in numerous court, arbitration and regulatory hearings, including:

- Supreme Court of the United States (Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 1992)
- Federal district courts in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Missouri, Indiana, Kentucky, Florida, Ohio, Alabama, and West Virginia;
- State courts in Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Wyoming, Texas and West Virginia;
- U.S. bankruptcy courts in Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and Louisiana; and,
- Regulatory hearings of the Surface Transportation Board, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and public utility commissions in the states of Utah, Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Ohio.

Mr. Schwartz has been a member of the Working Group for the Annual Energy Outlook prepared by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and testified at FERC’s Technical Conference on Environmental Regulations and Electric Reliability, Wholesale Electricity Markets, and Energy Infrastructure regarding the Clean Power Plan proposed rule. Mr. Schwartz gives presentations on coal markets at numerous industry conferences, for private energy companies and for EIA.

52 Headwaters January Report at 3.